The Battle of Adwa (Adowa)
In 1889 Menelik II, having defeated dynastic rivals,
declared himself Emperor of Ethiopia. In
exchange for peaceful relations and subsidies, the Ethiopian Emperor ceded part
of the province
of Tigre to the Italians
(forming the Italian colony of Eritrea ). The
Italians however were less interested in peaceful relations than the complete
subjugation of Ethiopia . Two versions of the Treaty of Wuchale were
prepared for signature, one in Italian and the other in Amharic, the language
of Ethiopia . Article 17 in the Italian version stated that
Ethiopia
was required to conduct all foreign
affairs through Italian authorities (in effect making Ethiopia an
Italian protectorate). In the Amharic
version, the Ethiopians were given the option
of communicating with foreign powers through the Italians.
In 1893, now secure on his throne, Menelik II repudiated the treaty, and denounced Italian duplicity, calling on the people ofEritrea to
expel the evil foreigners. In December
1894 a revolt in Eritrea
was crushed and the Italians decided to punish Menelik for not living up to the
terms of the Treaty of Wuchale (as they saw it). The Italians crossed the Ethiopian border and
occupied the towns of Makalle, Adigrat and Adowa . Returning to Rome briefly to drum up popular
enthusiasm for the war, Oreste Baratieri, the Italian commander, told crowds of
cheering Romans that he would bring Menelik II “back in a cage.”
Meanwhile, inEthiopia , Menelik II was assembling
his army. Ultimately, Menelik brought
some 100,000 men into the field. Nor was
this the type poorly armed native horde that Europeans were used to facing. During the previous three years, Menelik had
used the gold and ivory of the kingdom (along with the subsidies provided by
the Italians under the terms of the Treaty of Wuchale) to buy arms, ammunition
and artillery from Europe and the United States . Although the bulk of the Ethiopian forces
carried shields and spears, some forty thousand were well armed with modern
rifles and were supported by fifty artillery pieces.
Baratieri was woefully ignorant of these facts. Italian intelligence indicated that Menelik could not field more than thirty thousand men against the Italian army of seventeen thousand (ten thousand Europeans plus seven thousand Eritreans officered by Italians). It was expected that the Ethiopian forces would be undisciplined and poorly armed.
During most of 1895, Baratieri engaged in a number of small skirmishes with Menelik’s poorly armed vassals, re-enforcing his view of Ethiopian un-preparedness. On December 7th, however, a force of twelve hundred Italian trained Eritrean auxiliary troops, under the command of Major Pietro Toselli, were caught out on the open plains and totally annihilated by thirty thousand Ethiopian warriors. The Ethiopians next besieged the town ofMakalle .
After forty five days of siege Menelik offered the Italian garrison at Makalle safe passage in exchange for possession of the town. The Italian government of Francesco Crispi ignored Menelik's offer regarding it as an insult to the nation’s honor, instead sending more reinforcements toEthiopia to aid
in the war effort. Menelik now set out
to crush the Italians. Menelik, easily
occupying Adowa and the surrounding country,
threatened to outflank the main Italian army.
Baratieri abandoned Adigrat and
fell back to better defensive positions to await Menelik's advance.
Baratieri’s plan was to lure what he regarded as the undisciplined horde of Ethiopian savages into a frontal assault against his strong entrenched defensive position where they would be slaughtered by his rifles and artillery (a strategy which British General Herbert HoratioKitchener was to
successfully employ in the Sudan
in 1898 at the battle of Omdurman
against Sudanese troops). Menelik,
however, did not take the bait and the armies spent the next several months
until late February 1896 staring out at each other.
Stalemate was not acceptable to the government inRome which needed victory
on the battlefield for domestic political reasons. Baratieri received a cable from Rome which came close to
accusing him of cowardice and demanding action.
His ego pricked, Baratieri called his senior officers together. Baratieri revealed that the army’s supplies
would be exhausted in five days. They
must either retreat soon or attack.
Baratieri’s officers counseled an immediate attack. Vittorio Dabormida, a brigadier general,
proclaimed, “Italy
would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a dishonorable retreat.” European contempt for native enemies made
even a tactical retreat unthinkable. Initially reluctant, Baratieri finally
yielded and ordered an attack.
Baratieri’s “attack” was really no more than an attempt to redraw the existing battle lines to force Menelik to launch the type of frontal assault he had thus far avoided. The entire Italian force advanced under the cover of darkness with the intention of digging in on the high ground overlooking the Ethiopian camp atAdowa . Menelik would
then either have to attack the Italians or retreat. The plan made little sense except in terms of
placating the government in Rome
and his own impetuous officers.
Baratieri knew that the Ethiopians too were running out of supplies and
were on the verge of retreat. He also
knew that Menelik was unlikely to attack his entrenched positions on high
ground since the wily Ethiopian had steadfastly refused to launch a frontal
assault for weeks. Nevertheless, for
reasons which may have had more to do with ego than military necessity,
Baratieri proceeded with the attack.
The advance began at2:30
a.m. , but it was not long before difficulties arose. The maps used for these intricate maneuvers
were little better than rough sketches and were of little practical use. The Italians soon found themselves struggling
through steep passes, across barren hills and around dangerous ravines, gorges
and treacherous crevasses that cut up the country so badly that one Italian
officer described it as “a stormy sea moved by the anger of God.”
The various Italian brigades had become separated during the night march and at dawn were spread across several miles of difficult terrain. Emperor Menelik, who had been praying for divine intervention, could hardly have been luckier. Menelik had been planning to break camp and retreat the next day (March 2), and now here was the scattered Italian army advancing against his troops who quickly took up positions on the high ground overlooking the Italians.
Baratieri had squandered the advantages that defensive positions and concentrated firepower had given the Italian army, and now received the Ethiopian assault that he had been longing for. The Ethiopian cavalry swept in and through the ranks of Italians, slashing and stabbing, while wave after wave of foot soldiers rushed forward, and Menelik’s artillery pounded the Italians from the heights. The battle began at dawn and was over bynoon .
The Italians suffered about 7,000 dead and 1,500 wounded, with 3,000 taken prisoner. The Italians lost all of their artillery and 11,000 rifles. Baratieri’s army had been annihilated as a fighting force. The Battle of Adwa (Adowa) was the most crushing defeat ever suffered by a colonial European power by native forces in Africa.
In 1893, now secure on his throne, Menelik II repudiated the treaty, and denounced Italian duplicity, calling on the people of
Meanwhile, in
Baratieri was woefully ignorant of these facts. Italian intelligence indicated that Menelik could not field more than thirty thousand men against the Italian army of seventeen thousand (ten thousand Europeans plus seven thousand Eritreans officered by Italians). It was expected that the Ethiopian forces would be undisciplined and poorly armed.
During most of 1895, Baratieri engaged in a number of small skirmishes with Menelik’s poorly armed vassals, re-enforcing his view of Ethiopian un-preparedness. On December 7th, however, a force of twelve hundred Italian trained Eritrean auxiliary troops, under the command of Major Pietro Toselli, were caught out on the open plains and totally annihilated by thirty thousand Ethiopian warriors. The Ethiopians next besieged the town of
After forty five days of siege Menelik offered the Italian garrison at Makalle safe passage in exchange for possession of the town. The Italian government of Francesco Crispi ignored Menelik's offer regarding it as an insult to the nation’s honor, instead sending more reinforcements to
Baratieri’s plan was to lure what he regarded as the undisciplined horde of Ethiopian savages into a frontal assault against his strong entrenched defensive position where they would be slaughtered by his rifles and artillery (a strategy which British General Herbert Horatio
Stalemate was not acceptable to the government in
Baratieri’s “attack” was really no more than an attempt to redraw the existing battle lines to force Menelik to launch the type of frontal assault he had thus far avoided. The entire Italian force advanced under the cover of darkness with the intention of digging in on the high ground overlooking the Ethiopian camp at
The advance began at
The various Italian brigades had become separated during the night march and at dawn were spread across several miles of difficult terrain. Emperor Menelik, who had been praying for divine intervention, could hardly have been luckier. Menelik had been planning to break camp and retreat the next day (March 2), and now here was the scattered Italian army advancing against his troops who quickly took up positions on the high ground overlooking the Italians.
Baratieri had squandered the advantages that defensive positions and concentrated firepower had given the Italian army, and now received the Ethiopian assault that he had been longing for. The Ethiopian cavalry swept in and through the ranks of Italians, slashing and stabbing, while wave after wave of foot soldiers rushed forward, and Menelik’s artillery pounded the Italians from the heights. The battle began at dawn and was over by
The Italians suffered about 7,000 dead and 1,500 wounded, with 3,000 taken prisoner. The Italians lost all of their artillery and 11,000 rifles. Baratieri’s army had been annihilated as a fighting force. The Battle of Adwa (Adowa) was the most crushing defeat ever suffered by a colonial European power by native forces in Africa.
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