The Battle of Isandlwana: Zulu War

 

The Battle of Isandlwana, fought on January 22, 1879, less than three years after Custer’s last stand at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, was one of the most catastrophic defeats in British military history.

 

On June 25, 1876, at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, five companies of the U.S. Seventh Cavalry, some 210 men, under the direct command of George Armstrong Custer were wiped out.  The results of the Battle of Isandlwana would be far worse.

The Anglo-Zulu War stemmed from British ambitions to confederate South Africa under their control. High Commissioner Sir Henry Bartle Frere, without explicit approval from London, issued an ultimatum to the Zulu king Cetshwayo on December 11, 1878, demanding the Zulu disband their 35,000–50,000-strong army, accept a British resident, and become a British client state.

When Cetshwayo refused, Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, commanding British forces, launched an invasion with 16,500 troops, including 7,000 British regulars, African auxiliaries, and colonial volunteers, equipped with Martini-Henry rifles, artillery, and two Gatling guns.

The Zulus relied on their traditional "buffalo horns" formation—encircling enemies with flanking horns while the center engaged—using short stabbing spears, cowhide shields, and limited, outdated muskets.

Chelmsford’s divided his forces into three columns all converging on the Zulu capital, Ulundi. The central column, under his direct command, crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift on January 11, 1879, and established a camp at Isandlwana, 10 miles into Zululand. The site, beneath the rocky outcrop of Isandlwana hill, was chosen for its open terrain but was left unfortified. Chelmsford underestimated the Zulu’s speed, intelligence network, and resolve, assuming their forces were far away and disorganized.

On the morning of January 22, Chelmsford split his force, taking 2,500 men to scout for the Zulu army.  The camp now housed about 1,700 men, including 900 British regulars, 400 colonial troops, and 400 African auxiliaries, under the command of Colonel Henry Pulleine.  Unbeknownst to Chelmsford, a Zulu army of 25,000 warriors was closing in.

 Colonel Anthony Durnford arrived with 500 mounted troops to reinforce the position but, acting on a scout’s report, led a detachment to pursue a supposed Zulu retreat.

Around 8 a.m., a British scouting party stumbled upon the Zulu army concealed in a valley 5 miles east. The Zulus, initially resting, sprang into action, launching a coordinated assault by 10:30 a.m. Their buffalo horns formation unfolded with devastating precision: the left horn swept around the British right flank, the right horn targeted the left, and the central “chest” pressed forward. Pulleine deployed his troops in an extended firing line to maximize their Martini-Henry rifles’ range, but the line was too thin, stretching over a mile. The Zulu advance, moving at a disciplined jog, absorbed heavy casualties but closed the distance rapidly, exploiting the open terrain.

By noon, the situation deteriorated. Durnford’s detachment, returning from their pursuit, was cut off by the Zulu left horn and overwhelmed; Durnford was killed. The British line, hampered by the too slow dispersal of reserve ammunition during the fight began to buckle. Zulu warriors infiltrated gaps, targeting tents and wagons, disrupting resupply efforts. The Zulu horns completed their encirclement, and hand-to-hand combat ensued. The British, trained for disciplined volleys, were ill-prepared for the Zulus’ close-quarters ferocity. By 2 p.m., the camp was overrun. Pulleine, realizing defeat, reportedly handed the regimental colors to a lieutenant for safekeeping before being killed. Of the 1,700 defenders, over 1,300 perished, including 52 officers, 727 British regulars, 471 African and colonial troops, and others. Zulu losses were heavy—estimated at 1,000–2,000 killed—but they captured 1,000 rifles, two cannons, and vast ammunition stores.

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